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Abstract 
 
One main advantage of Islamic securities is their wider demands because Islamic securities are 
able to meet both demands for Islamic and conventional securities. This argument is valid if and 
only if the demands for Islamic securities do exist AND investors believe that Islamic securities 
do comply with sharia. One important regulator role in developing Islamic capital market is to 
ensure sharia compliance of Islamic securities and to convince investors regarding this 
compliance. Bapepam-LK carries out this role by publishing semiannually the list of Islamic 
securities (DES). Utilizing the first issuance of DES on September 2007, we employ differences 
in differences (DID) regression to see the immediate, medium, and long term market response to 
this announcement. We also estimate cumulative abnormal returns by employing the standard 
market model for the robustness test. We find that market reacts to sharia compliance 
declaration by regulator in the long-run, hence potential demands are realized and the Islamic 
securities will enjoy greater market power. We also provide evidence that Islamic investors are 
not too strict in screening Islamic securities and are willing to accept different opinions 
regarding sharia compliance. This finding could explain why Islamic finance is still growing 
rapidly even though there are critiques in the genuineness of sharia compliance of the current 
Islamic financial products/services. 
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Introduction 
In the last decades, we witness rapid increase in market share of Islamic finance. 
Kassim (2010) find that total market of Islamic securities grows about 15-20 percent 
annually and the market share of Islamic finance will increase further due to the rapid 
growth of Islamic banking and finance industry. She also estimates that Islamic equity 
funds will reach 1 trillion USD by the end of 2010, while the conventional equity 
markets remain stagnant because the prolonged affects of the U.S. and Europe financial 
crisis. The Islamic finance is also growing faster in the majority Muslim countries. Beck, 
Kunt, and Merrouche (2010) find that the market share of Islamic banks in majority 
Muslim countries reached about 16 percent in 2005, increasing rapidly from only about 
6 percent in 1994, while the market share of Islamic banks in global market had reached 
2 percent. 
Data shows that the number of institutions trying to access funds through issuing 
Islamic securities/funds is increasing. The International Organization for Securities 
Commission (IOSCO) reports that there were 100 Islamic equity funds worldwide with 
assets estimated around 3.3 billion USD in 2003 and their assets grew about 25 percent 
in the past seven years. Cakir and Raei (2007) find that sukuk (Islamic bonds) issuance 
was also increasing rapidly and globally, it grew around 45 percent in 2006. Godlewski, 
Ariss, and Weill (2010) point out that sukuk Issuance in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCG) countries grew quickly from only 7.2 billion USD in 
2004 to 39 billion USD in 2007; with global sukuk outstanding was around 90 billion 
USD.  
Increasing interest from financial institutions and companies in utilizing Islamic 
securities is because of the advantages offered by the Islamic securities. One main 
advantage of the Islamic securities compared to the conventional securities is their 
wider demands because Islamic securities are able to meet both demands for Islamic 
and conventional securities. 
There are two necessary conditions should be fulfilled to exercise the demand for 
Islamic securities. Otherwise, Islamic securities will fail to offer their main advantage 
which is to provide larger market demands. The first condition is that the demands for 
Islamic securities do exist. If the demands for Islamic securities are only a Fata 
Morgana, ultimately there will be no relative benefit to issue Islamic securities. The 
second condition is that investors do believe that Islamic securities do comply with 
sharia, otherwise Islamic investors will not buy this kind of Islamic securities. Hence, 
demands for Islamic securities will only become potential demands and we can never 
observe them in the market. 
There are some qualitative studies criticizing sharia compliance of Islamic securities. 
Beck, Kunt, and Merrouche (2010) point out anecdotal evidence that almost all of 
conventional securities could be reengineered to comply with sharia, therefore there are 
almost no different between Islamic securities and conventional securities. Nagaoka 
(2007) argue that murabahah contracts, which are very close to interest-based practices, 
dominate Islamic finance since the establishment Islamic banks in the 1970s, even 
though long before that, there were consensus among Islamic scholars that Islamic 
finance should be base on profit-sharing contracts and many Islamic scholars currently 
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only allow murabahah as a tool to escape from riba when profit-sharing contracts are 
not feasible.  
Besides to develop Islamic capital market’s infrastructure, other important regulator role 
in developing Islamic capital market is to ensure sharia compliance of Islamic securities 
and to convince investors regarding this compliance, hence Islamic investors will still 
be willing to buy the Islamic securities regardless all surrounded controversies. If 
regulators could carry out this role effectively, any potential demand for Islamic 
securities could be materialized. 
Some quantitative studies try to investigate whether Islamic investors are convinced on 
the sharia compliance of Islamic securities and whether they are willing to buy current 
Islamic securities or to utilize services offered by Islamic financial institutions. If 
Islamic investors are willing to buy Islamic securities or utilize Islamic services, we can 
observe that Islamic securities/institutions will have greater market power compare to 
the conventional securities/institutions.  
Weill (2010) compares market power of Islamic banks and conventional banks in the 17 
countries over the period 2000-2007 to investigate whether Islamic banks have greater 
power because they have unique “religious” clients. He finds no significant different on 
market power between Islamic and conventional banks. Surprisingly when controlling 
other variables, he finds that market power of Islamic banks was weaker than 
conventional banks due to the differences in norms and incentives applied across the 
bank’s type. Godlewski, Ariss, and Weill (2010) study how stock markets respond to 
the issuances of sukuk and conventional bonds. Using a sample of Malaysian listed 
company which issued both sukuk and conventional bonds over the period 2002-2009, 
they find that stock market reacted neutrally to the conventional bond issuance, but 
reacted negatively to the sukuk issuance. They argue that market perceived that only less 
healthy companies prefer sukuk than conventional bonds due to the classic adverse 
selection problem. They also argue that sukuk enjoyed greater market demand compared 
to conventional bonds; especially sukuk could meet excess liquidity in the Malaysian 
Islamic banks.  
To enrich quantitative studies regarding market power of Islamic securities, in this 
paper, we want provide a discussion whether Islamic securities enjoy larger demands 
than conventional securities. We also investigate whether regulator could effectively 
take a role in materializing demands for Islamic securities and whether regulator 
declaration is more convincing than sharia compliance declaration by another 
institution. 
Utilizing the first Issuance of the list of Islamic securities (DES) by the Indonesian 
capital market and financial institution supervisory agency (Bapepam-LK), we 
categorize securities into three groups: Islamic securities, new Islamic securities, and 
non Islamic securities, then we run different in different (DID) regression and also 
estimate cumulative abnormal returns by employing the standard market model for 
robustness test. We find that market react to sharia compliance announcement by 
regulator in the long run (3 months), hence Islamic securities will enjoy greater market 
power. We also find that market do not perceive differently regulator declaration and 
another institution declaration. Investors still consider securities as Islamic securities 
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even though there were conflicting opinions regarding sharia compliance between 
regulator and another institution. 
 
Islamic securities in Indonesia 
Development of Islamic capital market in Indonesia began with the issuance of Islamic 
mutual fund by PT Danareksa Investment Management (DIM) on July 3
rd
, 1997. Then 
on July 3
rd
, 2000, the Indonesia stock exchange (IDX, formerly known as Jakarta stock 
exchange) in collaboration with DIM launched the first JII which consisted of 30 
Islamic stocks. There were four criteria for stocks to be included in JII: 
1. The Company does not conduct any business activities that conflict with sharia; 
2. The liability to asset ratio in the annual or semi-annual financial report is not 
more than 90 percent; 
3. From the list of companies which comply with the first two criteria, the 60 
largest companies according to market capitalization are chosen; 
4. Finally, from the list of 60 companies above, the 30 largest companies according 
to average daily trading values are included in JII. 
Meanwhile, the sukuk development was started by the issuance of mudharabah sukuk 
by PT Indosat on September 2002. However, the milestone of sukuk development was 
the stipulation of the law number 19 regarding government Islamic bond on May 7
th
, 
2008, which followed by the first issuance of government sukuk on August 26
th
, 2008. 
One important regulator role in developing Islamic capital market is to ensure sharia 
compliance of Islamic securities and to convince investors regarding this compliance. 
Bapepam-LK carries out this role by publishing semiannually the list of Islamic 
securities (DES). DES was firstly issued on September 12
th
, 2007 which was composed 
based on the annual financial statements 2006, and followed by the issuance of second 
DES on November 30
th
, 2007 which was composed based on semiannual financial 
statements 2007. DES consists of sukuk, stocks, mutual funds, asset backed securities, 
and other Islamic securities. 
According to Bapepam-LK rules Number IX.K.1 regarding criteria and issuance of DES, 
there are criteria that should be fulfilled by companies for their stocks to be included on 
the DES, as follow: 
1. The Company does not conduct any business activities conflicting with sharia as 
stipulated on Bapepam-LK rules Number IX.A.13 regarding the issuance of 
Islamic securities such as: 
a. Gambling and games considered as gambling; 
b. Trading that is prohibited according to sharia, such as trading that is not 
followed by delivery/transfer of products or services, and trading with a 
fake offer;  
c. Interest based (ribawi) financial services; 
d. Buying and selling of risks that involve speculation (gharar) and 
gambling (maisir); 
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e. Producing, distributing, and trading products or services that are 
forbidden because of its contents (haram li-dzatihi) or stated forbidden 
(haram li-ghairi) by  Islamic scholars council (MUI), or that can degrade  
morals and are harmful;  
f. Transactions that contain elements of bribery (risywah). 
2. The Company has the following financial ratios: 
a. The ratio of interest-based liabilities to total equity is not more than 82 
percent; 
b. The ratio non-sharia income to total revenue is not more than 10 percent. 
 
 Data and Methodology 
We only consider stocks in this paper since the price data of the other securities is not 
freely available. We also consider only the first and the second issuance of DES because 
in that period, becoming Islamic or conventional stock is independent from any 
company actions.
3
 In the following periods, companies could adjust their financial ratios 
to comply with Bapepam-LK regulation to be included in the DES (endogeniety 
problem) and IDX also immediately adjust the stocks listed in the JII following the 
issuance of DES (no different opinion on the sharia compliance exist for considerably 
long period). 
We collect data of stock prices and trading volume from the Yahoo Finance. We 
exclude 15 stocks which their type is changed (Included in first DES, but not included 
in second DES, and vice versa). Our population consists of 116 new Islamic securities, 
182 non Islamic securities, and 30 stocks (Islamic securities) included in the Jakarta 
Islamic securities (JII). The new Islamic securities are defined as stocks which are 
included in DES, but not in JII. The non Islamic securities are defined as stocks which 
are not included both in DES and JII.  
As sample, we randomly take from the population 30 new Islamic securities, 40 non 
Islamic securities, and 29 Islamic securities (data of 1 company included in JII is not 
available in the Yahoo Finance). We categorize further 29 Islamic securities into two 
groups: stock included both in DES and JII, and stock included in JII, but not in DES. 
To measure immediate, medium and long-term market response to the issuance of DES, 
we employ simple differences in differences (DID) regression using the following 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) specification:  
                                                    (1) 
                                                          
3
 The first and the second DES were issued on September 12
th
 and November 
30
th
, 2007 respectively. These DES were issued base on Bapepam-LK rule Number 
IX.K.1 which was issued on August 31th, 2007. The first and the second DES was 
composed base on already published financial statements, annual report 2006 and 
semiannual report 2007. Therefore, company could do nothing to be included in the 
DES. Hence, strictly exogenous assumption on least squared regression could be 
fulfilled.  
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where     denotes cumulative return of stock i at time t. R is calculated in three different 
periods: immediate, medium, and long-term period which represents 1 day, 1 month, 
and 3 months respectively before or after the DES issuance date. In the first series of 
regressions, sharia denotes a dummy variable which take value of 1 if stocks belong to 
new Islamic securities group, and take value of 0 if stocks belong to non Islamic 
securities group. In the second series of regressions, sharia takes value of 1 if stocks 
belong to group of stocks which include in JII, but not in DES, and sharia takes value of 
0 if stocks belong to group of stocks which included both in JII and DES. T is also a 
dummy variable which take value of 1 if observations come from period after the DES 
issuance date, otherwise it take value of 0. X represents two control variables, trading 
volume and standard deviation of daily returns. This specification allows the stocks 
response depends on a set of control variables, for examples the response may 
correlated with the stock risks or trading volume. 
In the first series of regressions, we want to investigate whether new Islamic securities 
(stocks included in DES) gain more market power relative to non Islamic securities. In 
other words, we regard new Islamic securities as treated group and non Islamic 
securities as control group. In the second series of regression, we want to investigate the 
market response to different opinion regarding sharia compliance. We treat group of 
stocks which included in JII, but not included in DES as treated group, and group of 
stocks which included both in JII and DES as control group. We do not utilize non 
Islamic securities as control group to avoid selection bias, since JII only includes stocks 
which have the biggest market capitalization and the highest liquidity. 
We are mainly interested in    which capture the net effects of DES issuance, 
controlling for time-invariant characteristics among groups and differences in the stocks 
response across time. Formally,    could be written as: 
     ( |   )   ( |   )           ( |   )   ( |             (2) 
Since number of observation in the second series of regressions is not large, we also 
estimate cumulative abnormal returns using the standard market model to check the 
robustness of our results. Let    denote stock return of company i on day t and     
denote market return on day t, we estimate α and β for each stock using daily stock 
returns from January to June 2007 (the last observations are about 2.5 months before the 
issuance of DES) using the regression:
 4
 
                     (3) 
Then, the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for each stock are estimates as follow: 
     = [∏ (     )
 
 ] – 1 -    [∏ (     )
 
 ] – 1}  (4) 
where h is beginning of event window,  H is the end of event window, and h=0 is the 
date when 1
st
 DES was issued. 
 
                                                          
4
 Specification of Equations 3 and 4 follows Dellavigna and Polet (2009). 
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Result 
Table 1 provides summary statistic of variables utilized in our analysis. Comparing data 
before and after the issuance of the first DES, all variables after the issuance were 
higher meaning that Indonesian stock exchange was in the upward trend. New Islamic 
securities group consistently underperformed non Islamic securities group before the 
issuance of DES, however 1 month after the issuance of DES, new Islamic securities 
began to over perform non Islamic securities group. Meanwhile, JII group were the best 
performer. Overtime, they also grew quicker than others. It is not surprising because 
only the best performer (the biggest market capitalization and the most liquid stock) to 
be included in the JII. Therefore, JII could not directly be compared with other groups 
because of this selection bias. 
Table 2 provides regression results for the DID analysis. In this regression, we consider 
new Islamic securities as a treated group and non Islamic securities as a control group. 
We are mainly interested in    which capture the net effects of DES issuance 
controlling for time-invariant characteristics among groups and differences in the stocks 
response across time. Column 1 and 2 provide immediate market response to the 
issuance of DES. Immediate response is 1 day market response after the issuance of the 
first DES. Coefficients    are positive even after controlling for trading volume, but 
statistically not significant different from 0. Column 3 and 4 provide the medium-term 
market response which is defined as 1 month market response to the issuance of DES.  
Like in immediate response, Coefficients    are also positive even after controlling for 
trading volume and stock risks, but statistically not significant different from 0. Column 
5 and 6 provide long-term market response to the DES issuance which is defined as 3 
months market response. Coefficients    are 0.25 without controlling stock risks and 
trading volume and 0.24 with controlling for both stock risks and trading volume. These 
coefficients are significant at 5 percent significance level. This result implies that by 
included in DES, previously non-Islamic securities could gain more market power. 
Quantitatively, their stock prices, which also represent a whole company market value, 
will increase by 24-25 percent.  
The above results are statistically only significant in the long term due to the variation 
on the speed response from different market players. We argue that individual investors 
could adjust their stock allocation more freely, while institutional investors should pass 
several procedures to adjust their investment policy or to raise additional funds to 
respond the new sharia investment opportunities. Therefore, in the short and medium 
run, we could only observe responses from individual Islamic investors. As investment 
values of the individual investors are not large compared to the institutional investors, 
we could only see small increase in stock price of the new Islamic securities by about 
1.4 percent in the sort-run and 3.5 percent in the medium-run.  
Table 3 provides regression results to investigate the market response to different 
opinions regarding the sharia compliance. We treat group of stocks which included in 
JII, but not included in DES as a treated group, and group of stocks which included both 
in JII and DES as a control group. We expect that coefficients    are negative meaning 
that company will lose some market powers when its stock are not included in DES 
(considered as non Islamic securities by regulator), even though its stocks are still 
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included in JII (still considered as Islamic securities by another institution). Columns 1-
2, 3-4, and 5-6 provide regressions for market response in sort, medium, and long-term 
respectively. Coefficients    in all regressions are not statistically different from 0. It 
means that market does not response to the issuance of DES which implies that market 
does not perceive differently these two groups. We argue that investors still consider 
JII’s stocks which not included in DES as Islamic securities. 
Since our sample in the second series of regressions is not large (there are only 29 
stocks in JII available for our analysis), we estimate CAR to check robustness of our 
results. Table 4 provides short-run CAR which is estimated as a product of daily 
abnormal returns over the respective event window. We estimate one day [0,0], three 
days [-1,+1], and five days [+2,+2] event windows. We also incorporate four days event 
windows, [-1,+2] and [-2,+1]. These specifications allow for the possibilities that 
abnormal returns are realized before the DES issuance date as common practice in 
developing markets (Godlewski, Ariss, and Weill, 2010). We find that CARs in all 
event windows are not statistically significant different from zero for both groups 
meaning that there were no statistically significant market response in the sort-run, even 
though some JII’s stocks were not included in the DES. 
Table 5 provides estimated CAR in the longer period. We estimate CAR over six 
periods: 1 day, 5 days, 10 days, 1 month, 2 months, and 3 months after the first DES 
issuance date. Columns 5 and 6 shows that CAR over six different periods are not 
statistically different from zero meaning that there were no statistically significant 
market response in the long-run. It also means that market did not differentiate between 
group of stocks which included in JII, but not included in DES, and group of stocks 
which included both in JII and DES. This result is consistent with results of DID 
analysis and the sort-run CAR 
Our results provide evidence that Islamic investors are not too strict in screening Islamic 
securities and are willing to accept different opinions regarding product’s sharia 
compliance. It could also imply that market seems not to presume regulator declaration 
stronger than sharia declaration by another institution. This result means that not only 
regulator but also other stake holders (SROs, research institution, private companies, 
etc) could carry out the role in materializing potential demand for Islamic securities by 
making declaration that Islamic securities do comply with Islamic principles. 
 
Conclusion 
Utilizing the first issuance of DES on September 2007, we categorize securities into 
three groups: Islamic securities, new Islamic securities, and non Islamic securities, then 
we employ DID regression to see immediate, medium, and long term market response 
on this announcement. We also estimate cumulative abnormal returns by employing the 
standard market model for the robustness test.  
We find that market reacts to sharia compliance declaration by regulator in the long run, 
hence potential demands are realized and Islamic securities will enjoy greater market 
power by about 24-25 percent. We also argue that only individual investors could react 
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in the short and medium run because institutional investors still need time to adjust their 
investment policy or to raise funds to grab the new sharia investment opportunities. As 
investment values of the individual investors are not too large compared to the 
institutional investors, we could only observe small and insignificant increase in stock 
price of the new Islamic securities by about 1.4 percent in the sort-run and 3.5 percent in 
the medium-run. 
We also find that investors are less strict than our expectation. We argue that Islamic 
investors still consider securities as Islamic securities even though there were 
conflicting opinions regarding their sharia compliance. This finding could explain why 
Islamic finance is still growing rapidly even though many scholars criticize that current 
Islamic financial products/services do not really comply with sharia. This finding also 
implies that investors do not perceive differently sharia compliance declaration by 
regulator with sharia compliance declaration by another institution, meaning that 
market do not presume regulator declarations are stronger or more valid. Therefore, 
other stakeholders could also carry out regulator’s role in realizing potential demand for 
Islamic securities by declaring that securities do comply with sharia. 
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Table 1 
Summary of the Data 
 
Variables 
No. 
Obs 
Before Announcement After Announcement 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
New Islamic securities      
1 day returns 30 -3.0% 11.8% 0.5% 3.7% 
1 month returns 30 -8.6% 16.9% 3.5% 18.5% 
3 months returns 30 -15.5% 25.9% 1.7% 32.3% 
1 month risks 30 6.6% 5.5% 5.0% 5.0% 
3 months risks 30 6.4% 4.6% 5.3% 3.5% 
1 daytrading volume 30 30.3 105.0 28.6 129.0 
1 month’s average trading volume 30 21.2 53.7 29.3 78.4 
3 month’s average trading volume 30 23.2 56.4 21.5 54.1 
      
Non Islamic securities      
1 day returns 40 0.5% 10.8% 2.7% 10.5% 
1 month returns 40 -6.6% 28.7% 2.3% 20.3% 
3 months returns 40 -6.7% 51.4% -14.3% 33.7% 
1 month risks 40 9.1% 6.7% 6.5% 6.5% 
3 months risks 40 8.4% 6.0% 7.5% 6.2% 
1 daytrading volume 40 9.2 24.6 21.8 97.2 
1 month’s average trading volume 40 10.3 42.0 13.6 57.4 
3 month’s average trading volume 40 9.9 37.7 11.6 48.5 
      
Stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index      
1 day returns 29 0.2% 1.6% 1.4% 2.8% 
1 month returns 29 -2.3% 7.2% 20.0% 11.7% 
3 months returns 29 -0.8% 17.6% 48.8% 77.0% 
1 month risks 29 4.0% 1.5% 2.2% 0.7% 
3 months risks 29 3.2% 1.0% 3.5% 3.8% 
1 daytrading volume 29 19.6 35.3 13.7 22.8 
1 month’s average trading volume 29 34.9 48.5 35.8 42.8 
3 month’s average trading volume 29 38.3 49.2 36.8 44.6 
Note: trading volume is in a million. 
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Table 2 
The Effects of Sharia Compliance Declaration on Previously Non Islamic Securities 
 
 
Immediate response Medium-term response Long-term response 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
   
1.005*** 
(0.017) 
1.003*** 
(0.017) 
0.934*** 
(0.046) 
1.067*** 
(0.041) 
0.933*** 
(0.081) 
1.247*** 
(0.095) 
   
-0.035 
(0.028) 
-0.038 
(0.028) 
-0.020 
(0.055) 
-0.065 
(0.047) 
-0.088 
(0.094) 
-0.178** 
(0.083) 
   
0.022 
(0.024) 
0.023 
(0.024) 
0.090 
(0.056) 
0.051 
(0.053) 
-0.076 
(0.097) 
-0.167 
(0.115) 
   
0.012 
(0.033) 
0.016 
(0.033) 
0.032 
(0.072) 
0.039 
(0.060) 
0.249** 
(0.123) 
0.240** 
(0.103) 
     
1.74E-10** 
(6.78E-11)  
6.17E-10* 
(3.44E-10)  
1.02E-09* 
(6.08E-10) 
     
-1.13E-10 
(7.88E-11) 
 
2.28E-10 
(4.41E-10) 
 
1.41E-09 
(1.10E-09) 
      
 
-1.530*** 
(0.521) 
 
-3.862*** 
(0.518) 
       
-0.100 
(0.607) 
 
0.505 
(0.708) 
       
Number of observation 140 140 140 140 140 140 
R-square 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.29 0.03 0.37 
Ordinary least square (OLS) regression with robust standard error; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, 
*** significant at 1% significance level; Standard errors are in (). 
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Table 3 
The Effects of Non Sharia Declaration on Current Islamic Securities 
 
 
Immediate response Medium-term response Long-term response 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
   
1.001*** 
(0.004) 
0.999*** 
(0.005) 
0.974*** 
(0.014) 
1.066*** 
(0.021) 
0.977*** 
(0.029) 
1.300*** 
(0.102) 
   
0.003 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.029) 
-0.006 
(0.026) 
0.036 
(0.074) 
0.020 
(0.065) 
   
0.012 
(0.008) 
0.013 
(0.009) 
0.226*** 
(0.031) 
-0.097 
(0.059) 
0.575*** 
(0.241) 
-0.552*** 
(0.134) 
   
0.002 
(0.012) 
0.002 
(0.012) 
-0.009 
(0.054) 
0.004 
(0.043) 
-0.190 
(0.266) 
0.004 
(0.119) 
     
1.10E-10 
(8.44E-11)  
5.91E-10 
(4.32E-10)  
9.24E-10 
(1.02E-09) 
     
-4.86E-11 
(2.88E-10) 
 
2.08E-10 
(6.46E-10) 
 
3.66E-10 
(1.44E-09) 
      
 
-2.647*** 
(0.913) 
 
-10.859*** 
(3.454) 
       
11.775*** 
(2.425) 
 
30.120*** 
(3.495) 
       
Number of observation 58 58 58 58 58 58 
R-square 0.02 0.09 0.58 0.74 0.18 0.88 
Ordinary least square (OLS) regression with robust standard errors; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, 
*** significant at 1%significance level; Standard errors are in (). 
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Table 4 
Sort-run Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) 
 
Event 
Window 
Type of Securities CAR Std. T-value P-value 
[0,0] 
Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), and 
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES) 
-1.23% 2.13% -0.578 0.572 
 
Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), but not 
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES) 
-0.02% 2.10% -0.008 0.994 
[-1,1] 
Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), and 
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES) 
-0.85% 2.99% -0.283 0.781 
 
Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), but not 
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES) 
1.70% 3.62% 0.469 0.649 
[-2,2] 
Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), and 
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES) 
-0.97% 2.63% -0.370 0.717 
 
Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), but not 
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES) 
2.90% 4.22% 0.686 0.508 
[-1,2] 
Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), and 
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES) 
-0.76% 2.94% -0.260 0.799 
 
Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), but not 
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES) 
2.24% 4.51% 0.496 0.631 
[-2,1] 
Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), and 
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES) 
-1.05% 2.74% -0.384 0.706 
 
Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), but not 
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES) 
2.37% 3.51% 0.675 0.515 
Event of 0 means the day when the 1
st
 DES was issued (September 12, 2007); * significant at 10%, ** significant at 
5%, *** significant at 1% significance level. 
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Table 5 
Long-run Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) 
 
Time after 
DES issued 
Type of Securities CAR Std. T-value P-value 
1 day 
Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), and included 
in the List of Islamic Securities (DES) 
0.51% 2.62% 0.193  0.849 
  
Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), but not 
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES) 
1.50% 3.30% 0.453  0.660 
5 day 
Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), and included 
in the List of Islamic Securities (DES) 
0.54% 3.00% 0.181  0.859 
  
Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), but not 
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES) 
1.45% 4.90%   0.295  0.774 
10 day 
Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), and included 
in the List of Islamic Securities (DES) 
0.11% 4.08% 0.027  0.979 
  
Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), but not 
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES) 
3.37% 6.84% 0.492  0.633 
1 month 
Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), and included 
in the List of Islamic Securities (DES) 
0.15% 7.99% 0.018  0.986 
  
Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), but not 
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES) 
2.02% 12.01% 0.168  0.870 
2 months 
Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), and included 
in the List of Islamic Securities (DES) 
8.03% 32.32% 0.248  0.807 
  
Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), but not 
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES) 
8.53% 24.31% 0.351  0.733 
3 months 
Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), and included 
in the List of Islamic Securities (DES) 
29.37% 98.66% 0.298  0.770 
  
Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), but not 
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES) 
13.38% 29.53% 0.453  0.660 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% significance level. 
